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We spell out details of a simple argument for a security bound for the secure relativistic quantum
bit commitment protocol of Ref. [1].
Introduction
Recently, a new quantum relativistic bit commitment protocol [1] was introduced. Its security relies, essentially, on
the impossibility of completing a nonlocal measurement on a distributed state outside the joint future light cone of
its components. Its implementation requires minimal quantum resources: the receiver needs to send quantum states
(which can be unentangled qubits) to the committer, who needs to carry out individual measurements on them as
soon as they are received. No further quantum commmunication is required by either party; nor do they require any
entanglement, collective measurements, or quantum state storage.
We present the protocol here in an idealized form assuming perfect state preparations, transmissions and measure-
ments. We also make idealizations about the relativistic geometry and signalling speed, supposing that Alice and
Bob each have agents in secure laboratories infinitesimally separated from the points P , Q0 and Q1, Alice can signal
at precisely light speed, and all information processing is instantaneous. We discuss here the simplest version of the
scheme using qubit states and measurements in the standard BB84 basis [2].
Alice and Bob agree on a space-time point P , a set of coordinates (x, y, z, t) for Minkowski space, with P as the
origin, and (in the simplest case) two points Q0 = (x, 0, 0, x) and Q1 = (−x, 0, 0, x) light-like separated from P . They
each have agents, separated in secure laboratories, adjacent to each of the points P , Q0, Q1. To simplify for the
moment, we take the distances from the labs to the relevant points as negligible.
Bob securely prepares a set of qubits |ψi〉Ni=1 independently randomly chosen from the BB84 states
{|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} (where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉)) and sends them to Alice to arrive (essentially) at P . To commit
to the bit value 0, Alice measures each state in the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis, and sends the outcomes over secure classical
channels to her agents at Q0 and Q1. To commit to 1, Alice measures each state in the {|+〉 , |−〉} basis, and sends
the outcomes as above. Alice’s secure classical channels could, for example, be created by pre-sharing one-time pads
between her agent at P and those at Q0 and Q1 and sending pad-encrypted classical signals. If necessary or desired,
these pads could be periodically replenished by quantum key distribution links between the relevant agents.
To unveil her committed bit, Alice’s agents at Q0 and Q1 reveal the measurement outcomes to Bob’s agents there.
After comparing the revealed data to check that the declared outcomes on both wings are the same (somewhere in
the intersection of the future light cones of Q0 and Q1), and that both are consistent with the list of states sent at
P , Bob accepts the commitment and unveiling as genuine. If the declared outcomes are different, Bob has detected
Alice cheating.
Security The protocol is evidently secure against Bob, who learns nothing about Alice’s actions until (if) she
chooses to unveil the bit.
Alice is constrained in that she has to be able to reveal her commitment data at both Q0 and Q1, since Bob’s
agents at these points verify the timing and location of the unveilings, and then later compare the data to check they
are consistent. We need to show that, if she is able to do so then, essentially (up to some small probability defined
in terms of a security parameter) she was committed at P . (See Ref. [3] for a more formal discussion of security in
terms of a space-time oracle model.)
By Minkowski causality, Alice’s ability to unveil data consistent with a 0 or 1 commitment at Q0 depends only on
operations she carries out on the line PQ0. Suppose that she has a strategy in which she carries out some operations at
P , but these leave her significantly uncommitted, in the sense that her optimal strategies Si for successfully unveiling
the bit values i, by carrying out suitable operations in the causal future of P , have success probabilities pi, with
p0+ p1 > 1+ δ, for some δ > 0. By Minkowksi causality, any operations she carries out on the half-open line segment
(P,Q0] cannot affect the probability of producing data at Q1 consistent with a successful unveiling of either bit value
i there. In particular, if she follows the instructions of strategy S0 on (P,Q0], and the instructions of strategy S1
on (P,Q1], she has probabilities pi of producing data consistent with a successful unveiling of bit value i at Qi, and
hence probability at least δ of producing data consistent with a successful unveiling of bit value 0 at Q0 and with a
successful unveiling of bit value 1 at Q1.
This means that, with probability at least δ, by combining her data at Q0 and Q1 at some point in their joint
causal future, Alice can produce data consistent with both sets of measurements in complementary bases. Thus, for
2example, for each state |ψi〉, she can identify a subset of 2 states from {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}, one from each basis, which
must include |ψi〉.
Lemma 1. Given a single BB84 state |ψ〉, randomly chosen from the uniform distribution, unknown to her,
Alice’s probability p of choosing one of the subsets S1 = {|0〉 , |+〉}, S2 = {|+〉 , |1〉}, S3 = {|1〉 , |−〉}, S4{|−〉 , |0〉},
that includes |ψ〉, is bounded by p ≤ 1
2
(1 + 1√
2
), for any strategy. An optimal strategy which realises this bound is to
carry out the POVM
{1
2
P1,
1
2
P2,
1
2
P3,
1
2
P4} (1)
where Pi is the projection onto the qubit |φi〉 = cos(θi) |0〉 + sin(θi) |1〉, θi = i(π/4) − (π/8), and given the outcome
Pi, she guesses the subset Si.
Proof.
Recall first the standard state discrimination problem, in which Bob chooses a state from the set {σˆj} with associated
probabilities {pj}. Alice later makes a measurement to try to determine the state. Her measurement may be described
by a POVM {πˆj}, where outcome πˆj leads her to choose state σˆj 1. The probability that Alice identifies the state
correctly is
Pcorr =
∑
j
pjTr (σˆj πˆj) . (2)
In the variation here, Bob prepares a random state from the BB84 set. Alice gets two guesses at the state. These
guesses must be non-orthogonal BB84 states. If either guess is correct, she wins.
Write the BB84 states as follows
|e1〉 = |0〉 , |e2〉 = |+〉 , |e3〉 = |1〉 , |e4〉 = |−〉 . (3)
We use these states and the corresponding density matrices, ρˆj = |ej〉 〈ej |, interchangeably below. Alice makes a
measurement on the state received, and as a result of the measurement makes her two guesses. Alice’s possible
guesses are Si = {|ei〉 , |ei+1〉} for i = 1 to 4. Here and below we use the convention that |ei+4〉 = |ei〉 and similarly
for ρi and πˆi. Each possible guess should correspond to a measurement outcome, so we can associate each guess
{|ei〉 , |ei+1〉} with a POVM element πˆi (some of which might in principle be zero). Now the probability that Alice
wins is the average over i of the probability that Alice chooses a set containing ρˆi, weighted by the probability that
state ρˆi was prepared. Explicitly we obtain:
P(win) =
1
4
∑
i
Tr(ρˆi(πˆi + πˆi−1)) (4)
=
1
2
Tr(
1
2
(ρˆi + ρˆi+1)πˆi)) .
Thus the problem is equivalent, up to a factor of 2, to that of discriminating between the set of equiprobable states
{ 1
2
(ρˆi + ρˆi+1)}. Maximising the probability that Alice wins is equivalent to minimising the probability of error in
discriminating these states.
A necessary and sufficient condition on a POVM realising a minimum error measurement distinguishing general
normalised states σˆj chosen with probabilities pj is given by [4–6]
Γˆ− pjσˆj ≥ 0 ∀j , (5)
where
Γˆ =
∑
i
piσˆiπˆi (6)
and Pcorr = Tr(Γˆ).
1 Note that the number of outcomes does not have to equal the number of states prepared - in the general case there may not be a POVM
element for every j.
3For our transformed state discrimination problem we must calculate the operator
Γˆ =
1
4
4∑
i=1
(
1
2
ρˆi +
1
2
ρˆi+1)πˆi . (7)
and show that
Γˆ− 1
8
ρˆi − 1
8
ρˆi+1 ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 . (8)
It is straight-forward to verify that the POVM (1) satisfies this condition. For this set
Γˆ =
1
8
(1 +
1√
2
)Iˆ . (9)
Allowing for the factor of 2 above, we obtain Alice’s optimal guessing probability for the original problem as
Pwin = 2Tr(Γˆ) =
1
2
(1 +
1√
2
) . QED (10)
Lemma 2. Suppose now Alice is given a sequence of i.i.d. BB84 states |ψi〉Ni=1, randomly chosen from the uniform
distribution, and unknown to her, and is allowed to perform a strategy S involving arbitrary collective operations. Let
pi1,...,iN−1;j1,...,jN−1 be her probability of choosing a subset from the list S1 = {|0〉 , |+〉}, S2 = {|+〉 , |1〉}, S3 =
{|1〉 , |−〉}, S4 = {|−〉 , |0〉}, that includes the BB84 state |ψN 〉, conditioned on the first (N − 1) states supplied being
|ei1〉 , . . . ,
∣∣eiN−1
〉
and her guesses being S1, . . . , SjN−1 respectively, where the strategy S implies this is a possible list of
guesses for the inputs. Then pi1,...,iN−1;j1,...,jN−1 ≤ 12 (1 + 1√2 ), for any strategy S and any {i1, . . . , iN−1; j1 . . . jN−1}
consistent with S.
Proof.
Suppose some collective strategy S violated this bound for some values {i1, . . . , iN−1; j1, . . . , jN−1}. Alice could
then proceed as follows.
1. Prepare an entangled singlet state of two qubits,
2. Prepare (N − 1) BB84 states |ei1〉 , . . . ,
∣∣eiN−1
〉
.
3. Apply strategy S (ignoring her knowledge of the BB84 states prepared) to the (N − 1) BB84 states and one
qubit of the entangled states,
4. For the first (N − 1) states, check the guesses produced by S,
5. If the results do not agree with {Sj1 , . . . , SjN−1}, return to step 1 with a new singlet and a new batch of BB84
states. If they do agree, proceed to step 6.
6. Apply a teleportation operation on the unknown BB84 state |ψN 〉 and the other singlet qubit, obtaining tele-
portation unitary U . Complete the implementation of strategy S, obtaining a guess at a subset containing the
teleported unknown qubit U |ψN 〉. Apply the inverse U † to obtain a guess at a subset Si containing |ψN 〉. By
assumption, this guess is correct with probability pi1,...,iN−1;j1,...,jN−1 >
1
2
(1 + 1√
2
).
This iterated strategy is bound to proceed to step 6 eventually, and |ψN 〉 is left isolated until step 6 is reached.
Alice thus has a strategy that produces a subset guess for any single unknown state |ψN 〉, with success probability
p > 1
2
(1 + 1√
2
), contradicting Lemma 1. QED
Theorem 1. Alice’s probability pN of being able to produce data consistent with measurements in complementary
BB84 bases for N random uniformly i.i.d. unknown BB84 states obeys pN ≤ (12 (1 + 1√2 ))N . Hence, the security
parameter δ in the bit commitment protocol above obeys δ ≤ (1
2
(1 + 1√
2
))N .
Proof. follows from Lemma 2.
Note that this argument easily extends to give security bounds for large N in the presence of noise and errors, so
long as the total noise and error rate is below (1
2
− 1
2
√
2
). To see this let Zl =
∑l
k=1 jk − l 12 (1 + 1√2 ), where jk = 1 if
Alice’s subset guess on the k-th state is correct and jk = 0 otherwise. We have |Zl| < ∞, |Zl − Zl−1| ≤ 12 (1 + 1√2 )
4and (from Lemma 2) E(Zl|Wk) ≤ Zk for all l > k, where Wk is the set of subset guess outcomes up to state k. So Zl
is a supermartingale and the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality implies
Prob(
N∑
k=1
jk ≥ N(1
2
(1 +
1√
2
) + ǫ)) ≤ exp(−Nǫ2/(2(1
2
(1 +
1√
2
))2) , (11)
for any ǫ > 0.
Notes 1. After the work reported above was completed, an independent security analysis following different
arguments was circulated by Kaniewski et al. [7].
2. An alternative proof of Lemmas 1 and 2 and Theorem 1 follows by noting that for any collective guessing strategy
of Alice’s, any particular subset guess Si for the N -th state, conditioned on input states |ei1〉 , . . . ,
∣∣eiN−1
〉
and guesses
{Sj1 , . . . , SjN−1} for the first (N − 1) guessing games, must be represented by some positive operator A = A† ≥ 0 on
the N -th state. Since the states are i.i.d. and uniformly distributed, the probability this guess is correct is
Tr(A(
1
4
(ρˆi + ˆρi+1)))/(
1
2
Tr(A)) , (12)
which is easily seen to be bounded by 1
2
(1 + 1√
2
), for any value of i. That is, Alice’s maximum confidence quantum
measurement [8] on the N -th state is unaltered if she carries out collective measurements.
Moreover, this implies a further security result. Alice’s maximum confidence measurement on the N -th state cannot
improve on this success bound even if her strategy allows her sometimes to make no guess on some states (possibly
including the N -th). Hence the protocol remains secure for large N in the presence of any loss level (as reported by
Alice) below 1. That is, it remains secure even if Alice is allowed to report a large fraction of her measurements as
giving no result, so long as she tells Bob at (essentially) the point P which measurements were successful.
3. Another proof of Theorem 1 is given by verifying that a minimum error measurement for N BB84 states is
obtained by taking the N -fold tensor product of the POVM (1). This follows straightforwardly using the method
given above for N = 1.
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